HAMOOD UR REHMAN COMMISION REPORT PDF

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The Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report (or War Report) contains the Government of "Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report (Supplementary Report)" (PDF). Pakistan People's Party USA. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 March. The Hamoodur Rahman Commission was a judicial inquiry commission that assessed In , parts of the commission report were leaked to Indian and Pakistani newspapers. The full report was .. Jump up to: "The Supplement Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission" (PDF). computerescue.info Dunya News. Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report. 3. 3. Accordingly, after the prisoners of war and the civil personnel who had also been interned with the military.


Hamood Ur Rehman Commision Report Pdf

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We propose finally to wind up this supplement by making the recommendations. 6 download Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report To download computerescue.info Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report about East Pakistan Bangladesh Debacle. Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report. The War Inquiry Commission was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December The Report, PDF version.

Instead fraudulent and useless measures were adopted. The use of excessive force during the military action had only served to alienate the sympathies of the people of East Pakistan.

The arbitrary methods adopted by the Martial Law Administration in dealing with respectable citizens of East Pakistan and their sudden disappearances made the situation worse. The attitude of the Army authorities towards the Hindu minority also resulted in a large-scale exodus to India.

The Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission Report

There was wastage of considerable time during which the Indians mounted their training program for the Mukti Bahini and freely started guerillas raids into the Pakistan territory. Pakistan Army was almost unable to prevent infiltration of Mukti Bahini and Indian agents all along the borders of East Pakistan.

In the presence of these two factors, the Pakistan Army was obviously fighting a losing battle from the very start. There had been a large exodus of people from East Pakistan to India, as a result of the military action.

Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report page 1 to

The results of Indian efforts to propagate this refugee problem on an international level cannot be undermined. The Indian propaganda was so forceful that all endeavors made by the military regime in Pakistan to defuse the situation proved to be futile and left the world unimpressed.

The mutual assistance treaty signed between India and the U. No rational explanation was available as to why General Yahya did not take the dispute to the Security Council immediately after the Indian invasion of East Pakistan on November 21, Nor was it possible to explain his refusal to accept the first Russian resolution, if indeed the situation in East Pakistan had become so critical that surrender was inevitable.

The Army High Command did not carry out any in-depth study of the effect of these new factors, nor did it pay any attention to the growing disparity in war preparedness and capability between the armed forces of Pakistan and India as a result of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August The traditional concept of defense adopted by the Pakistan Army that the defense of East Pakistan lays in West Pakistan was never implemented in a determined and effective manner. The concept remained valid, and if ever there was need to invoke this concept, it was on November 21, , when Indian troops crossed the East Pakistan borders in naked aggression.

Unfortunately, the delay in opening the Western front and the half-hearted and hesitant manner in which it was ultimately opened only helped in precipitating the catastrophe in East Pakistan. Besides, the detailed narrative of events, as given in the supplementary report, clearly shows that the planning was hopelessly defective.

There was neither any plan at all for the defense of Dhaka, nor any concerted effort to stem the enemy onslaught with a Division or a Brigade battle at any stage.

It was only when the General found himself gradually being surrounded by the enemy which had successfully reached Faridpur, Khulna, Daudkandi and Chandpur the shortest route to Dhaka , that he began to make frantic efforts to get the troops back for the defense of Dhaka. The Report maintained that there was no actual order to surrender. In view of the desperate picture painted by the Commander Eastern Command, higher authorities gave him permission to surrender if he, in his judgment, thought it necessary.

General Niazi could have opted not to surrender if he thought that he had the capability of defending Dhaka. The full report was declassified by the government in , with additional reports concerning the year of It was constituted to conduct evaluated and analytical studies to inquire into and find out "the circumstances in which the Commander,Eastern command, surrendered and the members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a ceasefire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the ceasefire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The commission considered this initial report tentative as it had not been able to interview many key people who were at that time prisoners of war in India. One of the copies was given to Bhutto and the rest were either destroyed or were stolen.

Commission held an informal meeting at Lahore on 3 June to consider various preliminary matters and then decided to resume proceedings at Abbottabad from 16 July After the investigation resumed in the commission talked with 73 more bureaucrats and high-ranked military personnel.

The commission examined nearly witnesses in total, hundreds of classified documents and army signals between East and West Pakistan. The final report, also called supplementary report, was submitted on 23 October , showed how political, administrative, military and moral failings were responsible for the surrender of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan.

The commission, put the casualty figure as low as 26, civilian casualties. All the Governments friendly to Pakistan, especially Iran, China and the USA, had made it clear to Gen Yahya that they would not be in a position to render any physical assistance to Pakistan in the event of an armed conflict with India. However, the significance of this international situation was unfortunately completely lost on Gen Yahya Khan and his associates.

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They blundered ahead, oblivious of the fatal consequences of their international isolation. In the Main Report we also dealt with the activities at the United Nations during the critical days of the war, and came to the conclusion that there was no rational explanation why Gen Yahya Khan did not take the dispute to the Security Council immediately after the Indian invasion of East Pakistan on the 21st of November, , nor was it possible to explain his refusal to accept the first Russian Resolution, if indeed the situation in East Pakistan had become militarily so critical that surrender was inevitable.

While discussing the military aspect of the war in the Main Report we came to the conclusion that the major role in the disaster had been that of the ground forces, that the strategic concept embodied in war Directive No.

Having now had the advantage of examining these commanders at considerable length we feel we are in a position to formulate our final conclusions as to the causes of surrender in East Pakistan.

There has been some controversy as to the exact status of Lt Gen. Niazi, namely, whether he was a Theatre Commander or merely a Corps Commander, although he has been officially described as Commander, Eastern Command.

While a Corps Commander is merely a Commander of a number of divisions placed under his command, a Theatre Commander is not merely in command of all the forces in the area, including the Naval and the Air Forces.

Niazi was not a Theatre Commander and was never designated as such. Nevertheless, situated as he was, we consider that at least from the 3rd of Dec onwards, on which date war broke out on the Western Front as well, Lt. Niazi became, for all intents and purposes, an independent Corps Commander, possessing of necessity and by force of circumstances all the powers of a Theatre Commander, and even the General Headquarters expected him to act as such, for there was no possibility thereafter of replacing him by another Commander of equivalent rank.

General Niazi's conduct of war, as also his final decision to surrender, have, therefore, to be judged in this light. The traditional concept of defence adopted by Pakistan Army was that the defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan. However Lt. Niazi contented before the Commission that the Indians would not have started an all-out war in East Pakistan if the Western Front had not been opened by Pakistan.

It seems to us that this contention is based on a lack of proper appreciation of the enemy threat which was fast developing in the Eastern Theatre. The plan of capturing a sizable chunk of territory for setting up Bangladesh has also been frustrated by the forward deployment of our troops. An all-out war had, therefore, become inevitable for India, and in such an event the only course open for Pakistan was to implement the traditional concept of defending East Pakistan from West Pakistan in an determined and effective manner.

The concept, therefore, that the defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan remained valid and if ever there was need to invoke this concept it was on the 21st of Nov when the Indian troops had crossed the East Pakistan borders in naked aggression. Unfortunately, the delay in opening the Western front and the half-hearted and hesitant manner in which it was ultimately opened only helped in precipitating the catastrophe in East Pakistan.

Excerpts from hamood ur rehman commission report debacle

The detailed narrative of events as given by us in the Supplementary Report, clearly shows that the planning was hopelessly defective and there was no plan at all for the defence of Dacca, nor for any concerted effort to stem the enemy onslaught with a Division or a Brigade battle at any stage. It was only when the general [Lt.

K Niazi] found himself gradually being encircled by the enemy which had successfully managed to bypass his fortresses and reached Faridpur, Khulna, Daudkandi and Chandpur the shortest route to Dacca that he began to make frantic efforts to get the troops back for the defence of Dacca. It was unfortunately then too late, the ferries necessary for crossing the troops over the big Jamuna river from the area of 16 Division had disappeared and the Mukti Bahini had invested the area behind, making vehicular movement impossible.

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Orderly withdrawal of troops in time for concentrated defence was also made impossible by the unfortunate orders issued by Lt. In the absence of contingency plans for the withdrawal of troops into the Dacca triangle area behind the big rivers, to prevent the enemy breakthrough and to deal if need be with the known capability of the enemy to heli-drop troops behind our lines after it had acquired mastery of the air by either eliminating or neutralising our Air Force of only one squadron, it was not at all a matter of surprise that the defences should have collapsed immediately in thin lines in the forward positions were pierced by the enemy.

On the fourth day of the all-out war major fortresses were abandoned without a fight, namely, Jessore and Jhenidah the West and the Brahmanbaria in the East. On the next day the Comilla fortress was isolated by encirclement from all sides, and on the 9th of Dec , even a divisional commander abandoned his area of responsibility with his headquarters, leaving his formation behind.

On the same day 2 more fortresses Kushtia and Laksham were abandoned. At the latter fortress even the sick and the wounded were left behind. By 10 Dec , even Hilli, where a determined battle had been fought for 16 days had to be abandoned.

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The Brigade returning from Mymensingh got entangled with heli dropped Indian troops, and the Brigade Commander and some of his troops were taken prisoner. The Surrender The painful story of the last few days immediately preceding the surrender on 16 Dec has been narrated in Part IV of the Supplementary Report.

We have come to the conclusion that there was no order to surrender, but in view of the desperate picture painted by the Commander, Eastern Command, the higher authorities only gave him permission to surrender if he in his judgement thought it was necessary.

Gen Niazi could have disobeyed such an order if he thought he had the capability of defending Dacca. On his own estimate, he had 26, men at Dacca in uniform and he could have held out for at least another 2 weeks, because the enemy would have taken a week to build up its forces in the Dacca area and another week to reduce the fortress of Dacca.

If Gen. Niazi had done so and lost his life in the process, he would have made history and would have been remembered by the coming generations as a great hero and a martyr, but the events show that he had already lost the will to fight after the 7th December , when his major fortresses at Jessore and Brahmanbaria had fallen.

The question of creating history, therefore, was never in his mind.General Yahya Khan then embarked upon his scheme of by-elections in place of the disqualified Awami League representatives, but these by-elections were an exercise in futility, for the reason that they were supervised and controlled by the by the Martial Law administration, and even the selection of the candidates was being made by a Major General of the Pakistan Army.

It reveals more facts of history than any other textbook authorised by the Government of Pakistan. Appearing on private TV channels, Mr. The arbitrary methods adopted by the Martial Law administration in dealing with respectable East Pakistanis, and then sudden disappearances by a process euphemistically called "being sent to Bangladesh" made matters worse. The full report was declassified by the government in , with additional reports concerning the year of

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